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EXTENDING THE REACH OF THE CHINESE
LABOR LAW: HOW DOES THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S
COURT’S 2006 INTERPRETATION TRANSFORM
LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION?
Jill E. Monnin†
Abstract: Chinese workers are taking advantage of the dispute resolution tools
that legal reform has provided in the past decade, including mediation, arbitration, and
litigation. Despite a history of resolving disputes through informal mediation, more and
more workers are relying on the new pathways of arbitration and civil suits in local
courts. The 1993 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes and the
1994 Labor Law facilitated workers’ access to formal legal forums. Then, in 2006, a
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) interpretation made a number of important changes to
the application of the Labor Law and workers’ access to dispute resolution.
The SPC interpretation of the Labor Law expands access to labor dispute resolution
by providing a clear standard for determining when labor disputes arise, requiring courts
to accept appeals of arbitral decisions involving specific claims, allowing the suspension
of the arbitration application period, and permitting certain claims to bypass mandatory
arbitration. This Comment argues that the SPC interpretation successfully responds to
criticisms of dispute resolution under the Labor Law and will help to ensure that law
continues to operate as a tool for China’s workers and government. The SPC is likely to
continue filling gaps in the law and respond with needed changes in the absence of clear
legislative rules. Only the future will tell whether the potential impact of the 2006
interpretation becomes a reality.

I.

INTRODUCTION

China’s dramatic economic development since the country’s “opening
up” in the 1980s brought about important legal changes. As national and
international companies turn to China’s abundant and cheap labor force to
produce and manufacture an entire range of goods, Chinese labor law is
undergoing a dynamic rebirth and development. The 1994 Labor Law
(“Labor Law”),1 based on provisions of the 1993 Regulations on the
Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (“Labor Regulations”),2 is the
foundation for labor rights and relationships in China. Beyond coverage of
wages, healthcare, insurance, and working hours, the Labor Law also

†
The author wishes to thank Professor Veronica Taylor and the editors and staff of the Pacific Rim
Law and Policy Journal for their guidance and encouragement. She would also like to thank her parents
and friends for their patience and support throughout the writing process.
1
Labor Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective
Jan. 1, 1995), translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, 16 (P.R.C.).
2
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State Council,
July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, 76 (P.R.C.).
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provides for labor dispute resolution.3 This resolution process is at the
center of an important shift in Chinese dispute resolution away from forms
of mediation towards more adversarial arbitration and litigation offered
under the Labor Law.4 The past decade witnessed remarkable increases in
the use of formal arbitration and litigation for labor disputes.5 Workers are
bringing their grievances through the formal resolution process in greater
numbers every year with important implications for China’s labor policy.
Impressive statistics illustrate the shift towards formal labor dispute
resolution and highlight the potential that workers see in resolving disputes.6
Yet there are a number of weaknesses in the formal system, including lack of
finality in judgments, difficulties with enforcement of arbitral awards, and
ambiguities in the Labor Law’s provisions. Increases in the number of
appeals made from labor arbitration to local courts,7 along with attempts to
reformulate labor claims as traditional civil claims,8 seem to be symptoms of
these weaknesses.
An Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) on Several
Issues Concerning Application of Laws in the Trial of Labor Disputes
(“Interpretation”)9 is a recent attempt to clarify the labor dispute resolution
provisions of the Labor Law. While the impact of the SPC’s Interpretation
has yet to be seen, it successfully addresses a number of concerns with the
efficacy of the formal resolution process.
An analysis of the effects of the Interpretation on labor dispute
resolution can help to not only understand how the process may change in
the future, but also to appreciate the SPC’s increasing role in Chinese legal
reforms. For workers and employers who use the process, practitioners who
represent them, and others who monitor the many legal and political changes
underway in China, a close look at the Interpretation will deepen
understanding of the country’s developing labor laws.

3

See Labor Law art. 77.
See Fu Hualing & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication: Settling Labor Disputes in
China, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, Sept. 2004, at 18, 20.
5
See id.; see also Mary E. Gallagher, “Use the Law as Your Weapon!”: Institutional Change and
Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
JUSTICE 54, 67-70 (Neil J. Diamant, et al. eds., 2005).
6
See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 70 fig.3.5 (showing an increase in the percentage of labor disputes
resolved by arbitration from just under thirty percent in 1996 to almost fifty percent in 2001).
7
See id. at 73.
8
See Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 21.
9
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Law in the Trial of Labour
Disputes (II) (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Aug. 14, 2006, effective Oct. 1, 2006),
translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 2006, 1 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Interpretation].
4
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This Comment examines the provisions of the Interpretation, its
relationship to criticisms of labor dispute resolution, and its implications for
the SPC’s role in influencing labor policy in a socialist market economy. It
argues that the Interpretation successfully responds to a number of concerns
with labor dispute resolution and is likely to increase the number and
effectiveness of labor disputes. Part II provides background and context for
the increasing use of labor dispute resolution in China and the SPC’s
traditionally limited role in legal interpretation. Part III introduces the
contours of the recent Interpretation and analyzes the ways in which it
successfully responds to criticisms of Chinese labor dispute resolution. Part
IV then argues that the SPC’s approach to labor disputes exemplifies the
growing role of the court in interpreting law to fill legislative gaps. Though
the SPC is an organ of the Communist government, the Interpretation is
evidence that the SPC is expanding its interpretive role, much like courts in
other parts of the world.
II.

THE INTERPRETATION CONTINUES THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
USE OF THE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS

Recent economic development in China and the formulation of the
Labor Law provide context to understand the implications of the SPC
Interpretation. Laws and regulations now define Chinese labor dispute
resolution, creating a process that continues to draw attention as more and
more workers rely on the law.
A.

The Creation of Formal Labor Dispute Resolution Was a Response to
the Negative Consequences of China’s Shift to a Socialist Market
Economy

China’s economic transformation fundamentally altered the country’s
traditional labor system. Prior to 1978, Chinese workers depended on the
“iron rice bowl,” the term used to describe the lifetime job security available
to those who worked within state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).10 Starting in
1978, economic reforms in China required the country to remove the
traditional state allocation of jobs, introduce labor contracts, and give greater
attention to domestic labor conditions and relationships.11 These reforms
required the development of legislation as part of Deng Xiaoping’s “Two10

VIRGINIA HARPER HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
AND LEGAL REFORM 11 (2003); see also Gallagher, supra note 5, at 60-61.
11

See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 56.

LABOR RIGHTS
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Hands” policy: developing the economy while also strengthening the legal
system.12
In 1986, the system of permanent employment through formal job
assignments was replaced with a labor contract system.13 Leaders believed
that the new system would create choice and initiative in the labor market,
leading to increased productivity.14 The introduction of labor contracts
would eventually provide workers with articulated rights and obligations to
assert against employers within the formal resolution system.15 They also
served dual interests by “enhancing labor efficiency and flexibility, while
also protecting workers’ rights and interests.”16
A pivotal change came in 1992 when the Fourteenth Party Congress
introduced the concept of a “socialist market economy.”17 This new concept
encompassed a shift away from central planning and a move towards the
free action of enterprises within the market.18 An amendment to the
Constitution illustrated the importance of this new concept to China’s
continuing development.19 Article 15 was amended in 1993 to make explicit
that “[t]he state has put into practice a socialist market economy.”20
With the pursuit of the new socialist market economy, a variety of
labor issues arose, including unemployment, dangerous working conditions,
and difficulty accessing benefits and asserting rights.21 As part of reform,
state employment was reduced and large SOEs were sold into the private
sector, resulting in high unemployment.22 Millions of migrant workers
inundated coastal regions and cities, creating a “buyer’s market for labor”
and giving employers an opportunity to take advantage of abundant work
forces.23 With these various issues and the tensions they created within the
population, “[i]t is perhaps little wonder then that the state has made labor

12
Jianfu Chen, Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and Commercial Law in the
People’s Republic of China, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA 69, 70 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed.,
1999).
13
HO, supra note 10, at 10 n.2.
14
MARVIN J. LEVINE, WORKER RIGHTS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN ASIA’S FOUR NEW TIGERS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 79 (1997).
15
See HO, supra note 10, at 19, 21.
16
Gallagher, supra note 5, at 62.
17
LEVINE, supra note 14, at 6.
18
See HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 12-13 (2d ed. 2003).
19
See id. at 42.
20
Constitution (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982), art. 15, translated at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (P.R.C.).
21
See HO, supra note 10, at 1-2; LEVINE, supra note 14, at 31.
22
HO, supra note 10, at 12.
23
LEVINE, supra note 14, at 7.
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dispute resolution a priority and that labor issues have become so central to
domestic policy makers.”24
The government responded by providing formal procedures. The
1993 Labor Regulations were implemented to create an administrative
procedure for handling labor disputes.25 The 1993 Labor Regulations
replaced the 1987 Provisional Regulations on the Handling of Enterprise
Labor Disputes in State Enterprises (“Provisional Regulations”),26 which
only applied to contract disputes and the termination of permanent SOE
employees.27 While the earlier Provisional Regulations introduced a threestep resolution process, the Labor Regulations expanded the scope of
covered labor disputes.28 The Labor Law codified the Labor Regulations
and improved upon the Provisional Regulations.
B.

The Labor Regulations and Labor Law Provide the Current
Framework for a Three-Step Labor Dispute Resolution Process

Chinese labor dispute resolution is now a three-step process outlined
in the Labor Regulations and the Labor Law.29 These three steps include
optional mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.30 To begin the resolution
process, workers and employers may apply to the dispute mediation
committee within their enterprise, if one is established, or may apply directly
to a labor dispute arbitration committee to pursue arbitration.31 According to
Article 78 of the Labor Law, a dispute can only come before the people’s
courts if one of the parties does not accept the arbitral award.32 Therefore,
arbitration necessarily precedes litigation.
The Labor Regulations and Labor Law suggest mediation as the initial
step towards resolving a labor dispute.33 Under the Labor Regulations, one
principle that labor dispute resolution “shall observe” is an emphasis on

24

HO, supra note 10, at 35.
Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China: Critical Issues for International
Investors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 552 (1995).
26
See HO, supra note 10, at 38.
27
JOSEPHS, supra note 18, at 87.
28
See id.
29
See Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State
Council, July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), art. 6, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002,
at 76, 77 (P.R.C.); Labor Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994,
effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 77, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 16, 28 (P.R.C.).
30
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 77.
31
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 79.
32
Labor Law art. 78.
33
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 77.
25
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mediation.34 This standard and its appearance in the Labor Law reflect
traditional cultural preferences arising from Confucian and Maoist
principles, as well as a historically underdeveloped court system.35 The
mediation committee is located within an enterprise and is comprised of
representatives of the workers, employer, and trade union.36 The All-China
Federation of Trade Unions is affiliated with the Communist Party and
independent unions are prohibited.37 A representative of the trade union
serves as Chair of the committee.38 The language of the Labor Law does not
make an agreement reached with the help of the committee legally binding,
but any agreement reached “shall be implemented by the parties involved.”39
Arbitration is either an initial step to resolve a labor dispute or the
next step if mediation fails.40 Arbitration takes place before a panel of
representatives from the local labor administrative department, trade union,
and employer,41 who make a final ruling and determine an arbitral award.42
A written application for arbitration must be made within sixty days from the
date the dispute arises.43 This rather short statute of limitations under the
Labor Law overrides the six-month period under the Labor Regulations.44
Under Article 83 of the Labor Law, adjudication is a last resort for
labor disputes.45 Appeals from an arbitral award can be made to a civil court
within fifteen days after the award is received.46 Mediation is encouraged
throughout the dispute resolution process, even if a dispute reaches the
courts.47 While this is not required under the language of the Labor Law, the
Labor Regulations and Article 9 of the Civil Procedure Law both emphasize

34
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 4; see also JAMES M.
ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 395, 397 (2d
ed. 2005) (observing that the arbitral tribunal must attempt mediation during the hearing).
35
See Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., “Court-Performed” Mediation in the People’s Republic of China: A
Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts’ Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 394-99 (2000).
36
Labor Law art. 80.
37
Hilary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a “Socialist Market Economy”: The Case of China, 33 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559, 571-72 (1995).
38
Labor Law art. 80.
39
Id.
40
Id. art. 79.
41
Id. art. 81.
42
Id. art. 83
43
Id. art. 82.
44
Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State Council,
July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), art. 23, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 76, 80
(P.R.C.).
45
Labor Law art. 83.
46
Id.
47
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 34, at 397.
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mediation by encouraging courts to pursue conciliation with the consent of
the parties.48
Since its inception, many Chinese workers and employers have turned
to this three-step resolution process.49 Recent trends demonstrate that they
are relying on the process in greater numbers every year.50
C.

Statistics Illustrate a Dramatic Increase in the Use of Arbitration and
Adjudication Since the 1990s

Considering the traditional preference for mediation of disputes,
statistics of formal labor dispute resolution are surprising. Community
resolution of disputes has a long tradition in China’s cultural and political
development,51 illustrated by a two thousand year old Confucian proverb, “it
is better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be vexed to
death than to bring a lawsuit.”52 In imperial China, mediation was often
favored because of the “inaccessible and inadequate court system,” which
required traveling long distances to the nearest courts to face corrupt and
intimidating magistrates.53 When the People’s Republic of China was
founded in 1949 and previous legal systems were rejected, mediation
persisted and was codified in the 1954 Provisional General Rules for the
Organization of People’s Mediation Committees.54 Throughout Mao’s
leadership and the rise of Communism, mediation represented the belief that
individual interests must give way to community and harmony.55 As one
scholar said, “[I]nformal mediation played a strong ideological role, serving
to mobilize the masses through grassroots organizations.”56 Therefore,
mediation became a tool for the government to control the avenues available
for dispute resolution.
48

Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 4; Civil Procedure Law
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 9,
translated at CHINACOURT.ORG, http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2694 (last visited Mar. 8,
2007) (P.R.C.).
49
See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 54.
50
See id.; see also Labour disputes and wilderness cases more common in courtroom, CHINADAILY,
Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-03/11/content_110270.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007).
51
See Colatrella, supra note 35, at 395-96.
52
Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People’s Republic of
China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 133 (1996) (citing Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the
Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966)).
53
Colatrella, supra note 35, at 397.
54
See Jun Ge, supra note 52, at 123.
55
See Colatrella, supra note 35, at 398.
56
Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 581, 596 (1999).
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Statistics illustrate an important shift away from mediation to
arbitration for labor disputes. From 1996 to 2001, there was a marked
increase in the use of arbitration with a parallel decrease in the use of
mediation.57 During that period, the number of cases accepted for mediation
fell from 118,732 to 6,374.58 In contrast, the number of cases accepted for
arbitration grew from 47,951 to 184,116 in 2002.59 It is important to note
that any statistics related to the formal dispute resolution process reflect
those cases that actually reach formal forums. This data is only a portion of
the labor disputes that actually arise. However, the increase in the number
of cases arbitrated each year does suggest that workers and their employers
are using arbitration to reach a resolution.
Along with increases in arbitration, statistics also show a marked
increase in adjudication.60 From 1995 to 2001, the number of labor disputes
adjudicated in Chinese courts each year increased from 28,285 to 100,923
cases.61 In 2005, parties filed over 300,000 labor lawsuits.62 That number is
a 20.5% increase from 2004.63 The overall increase in labor disputes relates
to “[i]ncreasing urbanization, the restructuring of state enterprises, and the
new wave of foreign direct investment into China since 1992.”64 The 2006
Interpretation comes at a time when use of labor dispute resolution is at its
peak after over a decade of development.
D.

During Early Economic and Legal Reforms, the Ability of the SPC to
Help Implement the Labor Law Was Formally Constrained

When workers first began to use the formal labor dispute process, the
SPC did not act to interpret or aid its implementation. Formally, the SPC is
limited in its duties. Conflicting provisions of the Constitution govern the
powers of the SPC. While the Constitution provides that the “people’s
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power
independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs,
public organizations or individuals,”65 the preamble suggests otherwise.66 In
57

See Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 18; see also Gallagher, supra note 5, at 54, 67-70.
Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 18.
See id.
60
Gallagher, supra note 5, at 72-73.
61
Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 20.
62
He Huifeng, 300,000 Labour Row Cases Filed Last Year, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Hong
Kong), May 12, 2006, at 10.
63
Id.
64
Mao-Chang Li, supra note 25, at 523.
65
Constitution (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982) art. 126, translated at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (P.R.C.).
58
59
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its preamble, the Constitution requires that legal decisions be based on four
principles: 1) “the leadership of the Communist Party,” 2) “the guidance of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought,” 3) “the people’s democratic
dictatorship,” and 4) “the socialist road.”67 These are the four cardinal
principles espoused by Deng Xiaoping.68 Political influence and policy,
then, is made an integral part of judicial decision-making in China. In fact,
“[n]ot only is the substance of law determined by Party policy, but the
interpretation and application of law remains subject to changes in Party
policy.”69 Because the SPC helps to interpret the law,70 its interpretations are
subject to political influences and policies.71
The functions of the SPC include interpretation, adjudication,
legislation, and general administration of the judiciary.72 Interpretation was
traditionally limited because the Constitution only authorized the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret national laws.73
However, the 1981 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law
(“Interpretation Resolution”) extended interpretive powers to other state
organs, including the SPC.74 The Interpretation Resolution, which was not
superceded by the 1982 Constitution, authorized the SPC to interpret
“questions involving the specific application of laws and decrees in court
trials,” meaning adjudication work.75 While the Interpretation Resolution
gave the SPC increased competencies, those new powers were still limited.
With the increasing use of labor arbitration and litigation, weaknesses
in the dispute resolution process became apparent, encouraging the SPC to
act by promulgating the 2006 Interpretation.

66

Susan Finder, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L.
145, 148 (1993).
67
See Woo, supra note 56, at 592 (quoting the preamble of the Constitution).
68
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 126 (1999).
69
Woo, supra note 56, at 592.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Finder, supra note 66, at 164.
73
Id.
74
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Providing an Improved
Interpretation of the Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 1981,
effective June 10, 1981), translated at http://www.novexcn.com/interp_of_law.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2007) (P.R.C.).
75
Finder, supra note 66, at 164-65.
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THE INTERPRETATION SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSES DIFFICULTIES WITH
LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The provisions of the Interpretation make a number of positive
changes to labor dispute resolution that benefit workers. As the next section
argues, increases in litigation and attempts by workers to litigate rather than
to go through mandatory arbitration illustrate weaknesses in the process.
The formal labor dispute process has been criticized for lacking finality,
raising issues with compliance, and failing to provide truly non-partisan
forums in practice.76 The Interpretation makes four important changes. The
SPC addresses these weakness and provides more opportunities for workers
to bring their disputes through the formal process by clarifying how to
determine the date when a labor dispute arose, allowing certain types of
disputes to go straight to civil court, requiring courts to accept appeals and
applications for enforcement in specific cases, and allowing tolling of the
application period in certain circumstances.
A.

The Interpretation Requires Acceptance of Appeals for Specific
Claims, Helping to Improve Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

Arbitration procedures raise concerns about enforcement. While
arbitral awards are binding, the increasing number of appeals by workers
suggests that employers are not following through on their legal
obligations.77 The Interpretation does not directly address the lack of finality
in the dispute resolution process, but indirectly provides for final judgment
by requiring courts to accept certain types of appeals and enforcement
applications.
1.

The Rising Number of Appeals to Civil Courts Reveals Difficulties
with Enforcing Arbitral Awards

Although the Labor Law and the Labor Regulations intend litigation
to be a last resort for disputes, the statistics cited above show that labor
adjudication is marked by dramatic increases. The process has been
described as “one hearing and two appeals.”78 While only 1.7% of arbitral
decisions were appealed in 1995, nearly seventy percent were appealed in
76
See Gallagher, supra note 5, 73-74; see also HO, supra note 10, at 172-73 (discussing difficulties
with enforcement); and Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 19-21 (discussing difficulties with finality and
bias forums).
77
See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 73-4.
78
Id. (quoting a private interview with a lawyer in Beijing) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Beijing and Shanghai in 2003.79 A plausible explanation for this increase is
that arbitration panels are not providing final, legally-binding judgments in a
given dispute. The high number of appeals suggests two possibilities for
why this might be the case: either those who are unhappy with arbitral
awards are appealing, or disputants are having difficulty enforcing arbitral
awards and are hoping that the courts will ensure compliance.
Given that most arbitration decisions are made in favor of workers
rather than their employers,80 it seems more likely that the increase in
appeals reflects attempts to enforce arbitral judgments against employers.
Workers bring almost ninety percent of all labor disputes.81 Statistics for
major Chinese provinces illustrate that workers often win labor disputes. In
Shangdong, Guangdong, and Heilongjiang Provinces, workers respectively
won 62.46%, 55.88%, and 55.32% of labor disputes arbitrated from 1995 to
2001.82 These regions represent a majority of labor disputes, since they are
coastal regions where migrant labor is concentrated.83 For example, onethird of Chinese labor disputes were in Guangdong Province at the end of
the 1990s.84 In addition, a 1998 Ministry of Labor report found that fifty-six
percent of disputes initiated by workers came out in their favor while only
sixteen percent of cases were decided in favor of employers.85 The
remaining disputes were mediated, withdrawn, or went to the people’s
courts.86 The increase in appeals poses “an interesting and possibly
disturbing development”87 because workers may have difficulty enforcing
the arbitral awards against employers.88 Employers appeal only about five
percent of arbitral decisions,89 suggesting appeals have “more to do with
enforcement of the decision than with its outcome.”90 Therefore, it appears
that workers have to rely on the courts to force compliance in the face of
resistance by employers.

79

Id.
See, e.g. HO, supra note 10, at 168.
81
Id. at 152.
82
Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 21.
83
Id. at 18.
84
Id.
85
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 34, at 398.
86
Id.
87
Gallagher, supra note 5, at 73-4.
88
See id.
89
Isabelle Thireau & Hua Linshan, One Law, Two Interpretations: Mobilizing the Labor Law in
Arbitration Committees and in Letters and Visits Offices, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE,
SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 84, 106 n.29 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
90
Gallagher, supra note 5, at 74.
80
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The Interpretation Indirectly Provides for Enforcement by Requiring
Acceptance of Appeals in Specific Instances

The Interpretation requires courts to accept appeals from arbitration
panels for certain types of labor disputes.91 According to the language of the
Labor Law, parties “can raise a lawsuit” if they object to the arbitral ruling,
but there is no language in the Labor Law requiring the people’s courts to
accept these appeals.92 Under the Interpretation, civil courts must accept an
appeal from arbitration if the conflict concerns whether the employment
relationship was cancelled or terminated, or whether compensation should
be paid for cancellation or termination.93 A court must also accept an appeal
in a case involving a request by the worker after the relationship is cancelled
or terminated for money or collateral paid for her employment contract.94 In
a case over treatment of a work-related injury or an occupational disease, a
court must also accept an appeal from arbitration.95 Finally, a court must
accept an appeal in a dispute over advanced payment of wages or medical
expenses, or if the employer fails to make the payments following an
arbitration ruling.96
Requiring courts to accept appeals in these four types of labor
disputes expands the jurisdiction of the people’s courts over labor disputes
and will likely lead to increased labor litigation in the future. The
Interpretation allows workers to more easily appeal unfavorable arbitral
awards and will aid enforcement by ensuring that more appeals are actually
accepted.
While the Interpretation does not directly address the
noncompliance of employers with arbitration awards, clear identification of
disputes that will be accepted if appealed may make employers more likely
to cooperate in order to avoid litigation.
B.

The Interpretation Defines and Allows for Suspension of the
Arbitration Application Period, Addressing Prior Difficulties in
Determining When Disputes Arise

The rising number of appeals also illustrates that workers are
challenging rejections by arbitral panels based on the application period.
How to determine when the application period begins was never clear, so
91
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provides two solutions that will aid workers.
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The Interpretation

The Increasing Number of Appeals Reveals Difficulties with the
Application Period for Arbitration

The increase in appeals of arbitral decisions may relate to the Labor
Law’s application period for labor disputes. As mentioned above, the Labor
Law requires that applications be made to arbitration within sixty days after
the dispute arises.97 Workers are not always aware of this time limit and will
often approach the employer to negotiate a resolution before considering
arbitration.98 Yet, by approaching an employer, a worker may use up part or
all of the sixty-day statute of limitations.99 In its 2001 Interpretations
Concerning Several Issues Regarding the Application of Law to the Trial of
Labor Dispute Cases (“2001 Interpretation”), the SPC allows workers to
appeal to civil court when an arbitration panel rejects an application based
on the expiration of the application period.100 Therefore, the increase in
appeals may also result from workers taking advantage of this opportunity to
have a court review the arbitration committee’s decision to reject an
application. However, the problem of determining when the period begins
was not addressed by the 2001 Interpretation.
2.

The 2006 Interpretation Defines When the Application Period Begins,
Increasing the Likelihood that Arbitration Applications Will Be
Accepted

The 2006 SPC Interpretation defines how to determine when a labor
dispute arises for purposes of calculating the arbitration application
period,101 perhaps “one of the most contentious issues in [China’s]
employment law.”102 In a wage payment dispute during an ongoing
employment relationship, the dispute arises when the employer sends a
written notice of its refusal to pay.103 If there is no such notice, the dispute
97
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arises on the date the worker asserts her rights.104 For problems concerning
cancellation or termination of an employment relationship where the
employer cannot prove that the worker received a written notice, the dispute
arises on the date the worker asserts her rights.105 Finally, for a dispute over
payment of wages, severance, or benefits after the labor relationship is
cancelled or terminated, the dispute arises either on the date the employer
undertook to make payment or on the date the relationship was cancelled or
terminated.106
This portion of the 2006 Interpretation is beneficial to workers for two
reasons. First, the SPC places the burden of proof on the employer to show
that written notice was given.107 Second, it makes the filing date of an
application more favorable to workers by calculating the application period
from the date the worker asserts her rights.108 There may be future
complications when determining what constitutes the assertion of one’s
rights, such as whether it is the worker’s initial attempt to approach the
employer, or other actions taken by the worker. Nonetheless, these
provisions hold promise for workers whose disputes would have been
rejected prior to the 2006 Interpretation based on the application period.
The 2006 Interpretation also allows suspension of the application
period for arbitration in three situations. If a party is claiming a right against
another party,109 is making a request to a department for relief,110 or if the
opposing party consents to fulfill its obligations,111 then the arbitration
application period for the complaining party is tolled.112 The burden is on
the party seeking to discontinue the application period to prove that one of
these three situations is present.113 If one of the requirements is proven, then
the arbitration application term will “recommence” either from the date the
opposing party refuses to perform its obligation or from the date the
department makes its decision on whether to provide relief.114 The SPC’s
decision to allow suspension alleviates one of the primary concerns with the
short sixty-day statute of limitations—workers will no longer be penalized
for pursuing alternative resolution options outside arbitration. By clarifying
104
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when disputes arise and no longer penalizing workers who seek other forms
of redress, the Interpretation will likely lead to more arbitration.
C.

The Interpretation Recognizes Recent Attempts to Bypass Mandatory
Arbitration by Providing for Direct Litigation in Certain Labor
Disputes

The increasing litigation statistics include a small number of attempts
by workers to bypass mandatory arbitration and bring their claims directly to
court.115 Because only courts can provide final judgment in labor disputes,
these attempts could be responses to the challenges of enforcement
discussed above. The Interpretation explicitly provides for litigation without
prior arbitration in specific circumstances.
1.

Recent Attempts to Reformulate Labor Disputes as Traditional Civil
Claims Bring Disputes Directly to Court, Avoiding Formal Arbitration

Most disputes between workers and employers will fall within the
broad scope of the Labor Law. The 2001 Interpretation defines a “labor
dispute” as a dispute between a worker and employer under a labor contract
or where a labor relationship exists, or a dispute involving benefits such as
medical coverage and insurance.116 The Labor Law and Labor Regulations
require that all labor disputes go through mandatory arbitration before
litigation.117 Since labor disputes are so broadly defined, there is little room
for disputes to go directly to litigation. In fact, the Ministry of Labor
published an opinion in 2002 that provided that an arbitration committee
shall accept and hear a labor case, but only if it “falls into the applicable
scope of the Labor Law and the scope of acceptable cases” in the Labor
Regulations.118
However, there have been some instances where workers reformulated
their claims as civil actions. For example, in the Shenzhen region, lawyers
brought non-payment of wages disputes as claims for ordinary debt and
injuries received on the job as tort claims.119 Others brought claims for
115
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wrongful termination or invasion of privacy rather than pursuing
arbitration.120 These reformulations are made possible by provisions of the
Civil Procedure Law. Under Article 108 of the Civil Procedure Law, a
plaintiff must have a direct interest in the case, specify a defendant, make a
distinct claim based on facts, have cause for the lawsuit, and bring a case
that falls within the scope of civil lawsuits.121 Workers involved in a labor
dispute likely have little difficulty meeting the first three requirements.
Generally, claims are based on specific events experienced by a worker or
group of workers.122 The challenge lies in reformulating a labor dispute to
fall into the category of civil lawsuits, outside the purview of the Labor Law
and the situations defined broadly in the 2001 Interpretation.
An example of reformulation is an employer’s failure to pay wages,
which can be considered a debt owed by the employer to the worker. Under
Article 189 of the Civil Procedure Law, a claim for debt may be brought if
the parties are not involved in another “obligation dispute” and if any
warrant for payment that is issued by the court can be served on the
debtor.123 Additionally, the amount of money and evidence for the claim
must be specified in the application.124 Therefore, as long as there are no
other disputes between the worker and the employer, it is possible to
reformulate a labor claim and to bring suit directly to court.
2.

The 2006 Interpretation Makes Civil Courts Directly Accessible for
Certain Disputes

The SPC allows two kinds of labor disputes to come to court as
common civil claims.125
If a worker has evidence of a written
acknowledgment for wages owed by an employer and has no other claims
related to the employment relationship, then the worker can bring a claim to
court as a common civil dispute.126 This particular provision may reflect the
SPC’s acknowledgment that lawyers are reformulating claims.
The second instance in which labor claims can be brought as civil
claims based on the Interpretation relates to mediation agreements. As
previously mentioned, mediation agreements under the Labor Law “shall be
120
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implemented by the parties,” but no language in the Labor Law makes these
agreements legally binding or enforceable.127 In the Interpretation, the SPC
explicitly makes agreements binding when reached before a mediation
committee and allows the worker to bring suit as a common civil dispute if
the employer fails to perform its obligations under that agreement.128 This
provision offers an important enforcement mechanism, placing mediation
agreements on the same plane as arbitral awards.
The likely result of each of these changes under the Interpretation will
be increased labor arbitration and litigation. The statistics discussed in Part
II.C illustrate that workers turn to labor dispute resolution in growing
numbers every year. The changes made by the 2006 Interpretation will only
continue this impressive trend. When the SPC introduced the 2001
Interpretation, not all judges and arbitrators were aware of its provisions,
limiting its initial effect on labor disputes.129 It is possible that the 2006
Interpretation will face initial limitations as actors begin to learn of its
provisions, but it holds promise for future arbitration and litigation.
The increasing trend toward arbitration and litigation, however, may
challenge the institutional capacity of arbitration panels, civil courts, and
local attorneys who handle the volumes of disputes brought each year.
Arbitration panels are already “overburdened” and “understaffed,”130
patterns that would only continue with a greater influx of cases. Courts, too,
are already dealing with a high volume of civil and commercial litigation
and are hesitant to accept labor disputes, which are seen as “trivial and
tedious.”131 Chinese lawyers have an “aversion to representing workers with
labor grievances” for a number of reasons, including the low fee potential of
labor disputes.132 While the Interpretation extends the jurisdiction of civil
courts, access to justice for workers may be limited by the unwillingness of
lawyers to represent them. These other institutional aspects of labor dispute
resolution will also need revision to create a truly effective process, but the
Interpretation is an important step in the right direction for workers who
choose to rely on the Labor Law.
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THE INTERPRETATION ILLUSTRATES THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE SPC
IN INTERPRETING LABOR LAWS

The Chinese legal system is often described as “weak, easily
corrupted, and subservient to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”133
However, as one scholar observes, “[o]ne can recognize in the working of
[the] Chinese legal system the dual promotion of social welfare and
individual rights that is apparent in Western legal systems.”134 The
Interpretation provides an example of the dual considerations of social
welfare under the policies of the CCP and individual rights provided under
the Labor Law. The Interpretation suggests that Chinese law does function
in the domain of labor relations, and that the SPC plays an increasingly
important part in that development.
A.

The SPC’s Role in Interpreting Law Is Expanding Beyond Its Official
Bounds

Like all governmental organs in China, the SPC has a carefully
defined role within the structure of the state. That role traditionally included
a limited ability to interpret laws.135 However, the SPC’s powers to interpret
are expanding. Subsequent to legal developments such as the Labor Law,
the SPC’s historical role as a judicial organ of the central government is
evolving.
1.

The Imperfect Legal Reforms That Accompanied Promotion of the
Socialist Market Economy Forced the Court to Expand its Interpretive
Role

The SPC has increasingly exercised the power of interpretation
provided in the Interpretation Resolution.136 It has done so out of necessity.
Legal reform in the 1980s and 1990s produced vague legislation, making it
difficult for courts to apply promulgated laws.137 Legal reform was
originally envisioned as gradual. As Deng Xiaoping put it, “we should not
wait for a ‘complete set of equipment.’ In short, it is better to have some
laws than none, and better to have them sooner than later.”138 The result was
colorfully described by one scholar as a “disparate mass of laws and
133
134
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regulations [that] . . . does not possess sufficient unity to be regarded as a
coherent body of law.”139 The entire constellation of labor law has not been
immune to these inconsistencies, as the administrative regulations and local
and county rules tend to conflict as much as the Labor Law.140 With its
power to interpret laws, the SPC stepped in to fill legislative gaps. This was
referred to as “a creative law-making process,”141 and it appears to be a
process that the Standing Committee is willing to allow. The Standing
Committee has not interfered, even where SPC interpretations directly
conflict with a given piece of legislation.142
It is still important to consider the SPC’s administrative role and
continuing relationship with the CCP. The government continues to control
the available paths to dispute resolution through the Labor Law and Labor
Regulations. However, the SPC is acting to aid the efficiency of the process
and workers’ access to that process. The Interpretation is an example of
court-made rules responding to ambiguities in the law to foster greater
efficiency. The Labor Law provides an example of legislation that did not
keep pace with the needs of workers, arbitration panels, or courts.
Increasing disputes emphasize the ambiguities of the Labor Law’s provisions
concerning the application period and other aspects of dispute resolution.
The SPC responded with legal interpretation, filling in gaps and even
expanding court jurisdiction over specific types of labor claims.
2.

This Interpretive Role Is Not Unique to China’s Courts, and Reflects
Similar Evolutions of Judicial Power in Other Countries

China’s problems are not unique, as Western democracies also deal
with controversies over the interpretive power of courts.143 For example,
following the birth of the concept of separation of powers after the French
Revolution, civil law countries strictly limited courts to prevent them from
interfering in the law and policy-making sphere of the legislature.144 Those
prohibitions did not last long.145 Eventually, both civil and common law
countries came to accept some degree of judicial interpretation.146 For
example, in Germany, another civil law country, there is no legislation
139
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covering trade unions or the right to strike.147 The German Federal Labor
Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court have both stepped in to
provide case law in these open areas of labor law.148 It is not unusual,
therefore, for courts to take on a more active role to better facilitate the law.
B.

At Least Until Legislative Changes Are Made, the SPC Will Likely
Continue to Interpret Law to Ensure More Effective Use of the Labor
Law

The SPC is likely to continue balancing the competing interests of the
socialist market economy with the need to protect workers, if only to prevent
social instability. The SPC chose a reasonable approach in the Interpretation
and its effects will become apparent in the next few years.
Beyond its substantive provisions, the Interpretation will likely affect
the capacity of arbitration panels and courts to hear the increasing number of
labor disputes. The SPC is the administrator of the judicial system.149 By
expanding the jurisdiction of civil courts to hear certain types of labor
disputes, the Interpretation removes some of the pressure placed on already
strained arbitration committees. At the same time, the Interpretation’s
overall impact will likely lead to an increasing number of disputes so that
capacity and resources remain challenges to effective dispute resolution.
However, legislative changes are necessary to fully respond to those
concerns. In the meantime, the SPC is taking an active role.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1994 Labor Law bestows rights that an impressive number of
workers assert each year. Statistics illustrate the transition of labor dispute
resolution away from mediation within enterprises toward adjudication and
litigation in a formal setting. Unfortunately, workers who use labor dispute
resolution are only a small portion of those who could assert their rights.
The 2006 Interpretation by the SPC expands the reach of the Labor
Law to encompass a larger variety of disputes and to give workers more
opportunities to bring claims that would have been denied in the past. It
clarifies ambiguities that once drew criticism. There is now a clear standard
for determining when a labor dispute arises. Courts must now accept certain
appeals of arbitral decisions. Workers will no longer be penalized for
147
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pursuing alternative means of resolving their disputes because the
application period for arbitration can be tolled. Certain claims can bypass
arbitration and no longer have to rely on reformulations under the Civil
Procedure Law.
There will likely be difficulties with the capacity of legal institutions
to handle the continuing increases in arbitration and litigation that the 2006
Interpretation will fuel. Consideration of these challenges will become even
more important as dispute resolution increases. As the SPC’s interpretive
role expands, the court can aid with those challenges. But the ultimate
decisions rest with the other organs of government that crafted the Labor
Law. The SPC can only extend the reach of the Labor Law so far. The court
has taken an important step and workers will benefit from it.
As long as there are inconsistencies and gaps in the law, the court will
continue to respond with needed changes. The effects of the SPC
Interpretation will not be known for a number of years, but it holds promise
for the future of labor dispute resolution in China.

